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BOOK REVIEWS
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND.

By Jerome Frank.

New York: Brentano's Inc.

1930. pp. xix, 368.
THE popular price for which this book is now offered to the public should attract
buyers who are interested in the subject-matter of the book. It has been many times
reviewed. But now that its price puts it within reach of the proletariat and the law
student, perhaps another review of it will not be amiss.
It is a thought-stimulating book. As the "Devil's Advocate," raising objections
to the canonization of the traditional theories concerning the essence of law and
the nature of the judicial process, Frank is superb. He states facts admirably. He
sets forth his concept of what the law is in the simplest possible language:
"It is sometimes asserted that to deny that law consists of rules is to deny the
existence of legal rules. This is specious reasoning. To deny that a cow consists of
grass is not to deny the reality of the grass or that the cow eats it. So while rules
are not the only factor in the making of law, i.e., decisions, that is not to say thero
are no rules." (p. 132) Law, therefore, according to Frank, consists of decisions.
Again: "The business of judges is to dispose of litigation, not to formulate rules,
that is, not to state accurate generalizations of the result of their decisions, or accurate forecasts of future decisions." (p. 277)
While these passages are admirably clear, it does not follow that they express the
truth. Frank here appears to identify law with adjudication. And he claims that
the business of the judge is only to adjudicate, that is, to determine in concreto
the rights and liabilities of the parties before the court. It is obvious that the
judge must adjudicate. But can he adjudicate without the aid of some norm? Men
generally call the norm by which the judgment is directed, law. To Frank, not the
norm, but the judgment itself is law. Words are arbitrary symbols of thought. And
Frank may, if he chooses, use the word "law" in the sense of decision. But it is
important for the reader to understand that he is doing so; else, the entire book will
be unintelligible.
There was adjudication before Mansfield's time. But, according to Lord Campbell,' "no general rule was laid down which could afterwards be referred to for the
purpose of settling similar disputes," in relation to commercial matters, If "decisions" means law, there was plenty of law before Mansfield's time. Lord Campbell
evidently did not understand the word law to mean "decisions," when he wrote,
"He (Mansfield) formed a very low, and I am afraid a very just estimate of the
Common Law of England which he was to administer." 2 What was the defect in
the law as Mansfield found it? Lack of suitable rulesl Mansfield adjudicated,
and formulated rules: ". . . not only in doing justice to the parties litigating before
him, but in settling with precision and upon sound principles a general rule, afterwards to be quoted and recognized as governing all similar cases."8
As to the predictability of the decision (which Frank scouts), Lord Campbell
has this to say: "When the facts were ascertained, the decision might be with
confidence anticipated; and the experienced advocate knew when to sit down, his
cause being either secure or hopeless. The consequence was that business was done
1. III Lives of the Chief Justices 300 (1873).
Id. at 299.
3. Id. at 301.
2.
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not only with certainty but celerity. ' 4 Is it any wonder, then, that the legal profession of that day considered the body of rules administered in Mlansfield's court,
as the law of that court? Or, that law, in so far as it exists at all, consists of the
body of rules by which the rights and liabilities of the litigants will be decided?
If Frank seriously believes that law consists of "decisions," and not of rules, he
should give an interpretation of such phrases as "Due Process of Law," and "The
Law of the Land," which will harmonize with his identification of law with decisions.
Certainly in the mind of the common man, the word "lave' stands not for the
decision, but for the norm according to which the decision is made. The generic
similarity which is expressed by the word law, as applied to the operations of nature
and state regulations, rests upon the fact of regularity of recurrence. It is said,
in popular language, that it is a law of nature that the sun should rise every day.
It is also said that a conviction for first degree murder in New York State carries
with it a sentence of capital punishment In each case it can be said that law is
operating, because there is regularity in the recurrence of the stated event. Frank's
identification of law with "decisions" makes no provision for regularity of recurrence, and so omits an essential element of the notion of law.
Frank quotes with approval Judge Hutcheson's account of the judicial process:
"In feeling or hunching out his decisions the judge acts not differently from, but
precisely as lawyers do in working on their cases, with only this exception, that the
lawyer in having a predetermined destination in view-to win the law suit for his
client-looks for and regards only those hunches which keep him in the path that he
has chosen, while the judge, being merely on his way with a roving commission to
find the just solution, will follow his hunch wherever it leads him."!5
Frank adds: "We may accept this as an approximately correct description of how
all judges do their thinking." 6 (p. 104)
Frank here indulges in a reckless generalization. Judge Hutcheson was explaining
the judicial process as he conceived it to be exercised by a judge of a trial court,
sitting without a jury. Under the Anglo-American system of law, the functions of
the judge sitting without a jury are different from the functions of the judge conducting a jury trial; and the functions of both are different from those of the judge
on the highest appellate court. Sitting without a jury, the judge answers questions
both of fact and of law. Sitting with a jury the judge's answers are confined to
what are called questions of law. Sitting on the highest appellate court, the judge
reviews the answers to questions of law made by the trial judge to determine whether
each of the litigants has had the full benefit of due process of law. In the highest
appellate court, the judge may vote to affirm, reverse or modify the judgment of
the trial court. He may not substitute a judgment of his own for the judgment
of the trial court. It is his function to declare whether the law has been properly
applied in the trial court. It is in this sense that the highest appellate court is
sometimes said to be not a court of justice, but a court of law. It is assumed that
the law ordinarily works justice. It is the function of the highest appellate court
to see to it that law does its work, that the litigants receive the full benefit of its
provisions.
Notwithstanding the fact that the functions of the judge vary with his position.
4. Id. at 473.
5. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judidal
Decisions (1929) 14 Com. L. Q. 274, 278.
6. Italics the writer's.
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Frank maintains that the mind of the judges in all these various positions operates
in the same way. It is obvious that the highest appellate court is not required to
"hunch out" a decision. It does not produce a judgment. It tests out the value of
a judgment produced by another court. Its function is one of inference. It infers
the agreement or disagreement of the judgment which comes up to it for review
with the established rules of law.
Frank has offered no evidence for the truth of the statement that: "We may
accept this as an approximately correct description of how all judges do their thinking." Yet he allowed his impulse to establish the "hunch" theory as the adequate
explanation of the entire judicial process to control his pen-(or his typewriter)in setting down this unwarranted generalization.
What does Judge Hutcheson mean by "hunching out his decisions?" Let us take
the case of Solomon, sitting as a judge, and trying to determine which of the two
women before him was really the mother of the child which each claimed as her own. 7
Judge Solomon, apparently sitting without a jury, like Judge Hutcheson, has "a roving
commission to find a just solution." Solomon is judge both of fact and of law. The
law to be applied here is clearly established: the child must be awarded to its
true mother. The question of fact is not so easy of solution. The testimony before
the court is contradictory. How is the judge to determine which of the witnesses
is telling the truth? Solomon calls for a sword, and pretends a willingness to slit
the child into two parts, and give one part to each woman. Did Solomon really
intend to go through with the homicide, in case both women agreed to it? It is
not likely. It was undisputed that one of the two women was the true mother. But
which? Solomon worked a "third degree" on the pretending one. She fell into
the trap. Her willingness to have the child cut into two parts was evidence that
the child was not hers. His judgment was quickly formed. Was Solomon "hunching his way to a decision?" Yes, if you mean by hunching, reasoning. We reason
when we trace causes to their effects, or effects to their causes. By his trick Solomon
brought to light what the schoolmen called the ratio essendi (reason for the existence of the fact), and thereupon became possessed of the ratio cognoscendi (ground
for certainty in relation to the fact).
Solomon was testing out for a manifestation of mother-love. The threat of death
to her child would cause the true mother to reject the proposal to cut the child
into two parts. Mother-love was the ratio essendi for the true mother's refusal of
the offer of the judge. Solomon now had the ratio cognoscendi-ground for certain
knowledge as to which is the true mother. It was a spectacular exercise of reasoning
power. Could it be said that Solomon here "hunched his way to a decision?"
Perhaps Judge Hutcheson might have a doubt about the propriety of using the
expression in this case. Judge Hutcheson seems to suggest that when he is "hunching" for a decision, he is not certain at the outset what the decision will be. We
may presume that in the present case the outcome was exactly what Solomon had
anticipated it would be. Is it of the essence of the hunch that the outcome should not
be foreseen with certainty? If so, then, perhaps, it might not be safe to say that in
this case Solomon "hunched his way to a decision." We shall have to await the
judgment of the "hunchers" on this point.
Frank is constantly inveighing against the use of logic by the judges, attributing
to their love of logic their defects of judgment. (See Part I, Chapter VII) As
well might he attribute the present depression to the rules of mathematics. Mathematics will tell you how much you are making or how much you are losing. But it
will not make anything or lose anything for you. You must do the making or
7.

III Kings, III 16 Douay; I Kings, III 16, King James (Revised).
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losing yourself. So a proposition is not necessarily true or necessarily false because
it is correctly derived from other propositions. Logic guarantees merely correctness
of inference, not truth-unless the inferred proposition is correctly derived from other
propositions whose truth is established. Frank might as reasonably blame the scales
for his over-weight-(if he is over-weight)-as blame logic for the errors of the
judge. The logic of the lower court is as good as the logic of the appellate court
which reverses its judgment. The difference consists not in the quality of the logic,
but in the quality of the legal principle upon which each relies.
Frank maintains that it is a survival of childishness in the grown man to eepect
certainty in law. (Part I, Chapter I) He claims that law is uncertain because the
decisions of the courts are unpredictable, and because he identifies law with the
decision. As for the predictability of decisions, a man may be able to forecast,
if he is deeply versed in the law, in nine cases out of ten, how the highest appellate
court will decide a hotly contested point. But on the tenth occasion-?
I remember very well the day the United States Supreme Court published its
decision in the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Case.8 A professor who had come
into my office had inquired of me whether the decision had yet been published. I
did not know. "Well," he said, "I will tell you what it will be. The decision will
be against the statute, and the vote will be unanimous." While he was speaking.
another professor entered my office, just in time to hear this prophecy. "You are
wrong," said the other professor, "it will be a five to four decision." And he named
the five judges who would vote for affirmance. Eis forecast was absolutely accurate.
Both these professors knew the rules of law. One of them, apparently, knew more
about the judges than the other.
To be able to predict with accuracy the outcoming decision, I agree with Frank
that one should know, not only rules of law, but also the bent of the judge. Frank
holds that the decision is unpredictable, and that the decision is law. But he does
not tell us what decision is law. The decision of the jury? Of the judge sitting
without a jury? Of the intermediate appellate court? Of the highest court of
appeal? In each case a decision is made. And, if the decision is law, they are all
making law. And the decision is unpredictable, with anything approaching certainty,
because these law-making agencies often make contradictory laws, i.e., decisions. Wh"at
men mean when they assert that the decision is predictable is the decision as
issuing from the highest court of appeal. They do not hold that this decision is
predictable in every case. There is a twilight zone of uncertainty, as is evident
from the dissenting opinions.
One of the essential elements of the decision of the court (as distinguished from
the decision of the jury), is that it should be a judicial declaration of the rights
and liabilities of the litigants before the court. Law is the norm, by which rights
and liabilities are measured. Law is the scales, not the object weighed, nor the
weight. Law is a measure, not a measurement. Frank holds law to be a measurement, i.e., a decision.
There are several sources of uncertainty with regard to the decision. One is the
fact that it cannot be known with certainty, in advance, which of several available
standards-rules-the court will employ to do the measuring. Another source of
uncertainty is the measure of consideration the court will give to the circumstances
of the case. A statute whose operation will bring about certain consequences in
one set of circumstances may be declared unconstitutional, while a similar statute
in other circumstances may be declared constitutional. Common sense requires the
8.

Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934).
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judge to consider the consequences in relation to the circumstances. The judgment
of the judge is a mental act. His judgment must be made to appear to harmonize
with the recognized rules of law. His written opinion is, as Frank says, his apologia
for his judgment. His choice of rule points the way to his decision. His judgmentdecision-will be, not the measure, but measurement. The measurement, as issuing
from the highest appellate court, is generally, though not always, predictable by the
lawyer who is thoroughly acquainted with the rules of law, knows the bent of the
judge, and gives due consideration to the consequences in the circumstances, and when
the case involves issues upon which the court has ruled in the past. For the judicial
interpretation of a new corpus juris such as the NIRA, no sane man would claim
predictability.
JOHN X. PYNE, S. J.'f

THE FAmiLy IN COURT. By Jonah J. Goldstein. New York: Clark Boardman Co.,
Ltd. 1934. pp. xiii, 284.
Judge Jonah J. Goldstein, City Magistrate in New York City, has written this
book "in the hope of arousing greater interest in the subject of the Law's Mishandling of Domestic Relations." He expresses the sentiment that an aroused
public interest and the use of common sense will tend to bring about necessary
changes in the Family Court, for the sake of the families of today and tomorrow.
The book touches upon every phase of family relations, youthful crime, parents'
quarrels, and all the myriad problems of everyday life which come up in the inferior
criminal courts. Anyone who reads the book must come to the conclusion that our
courts have lagged behind in the administration of justice, as applied to the varied
and complex social problems encountered in these courts daily.
The discussion is interesting, full of human appeal, and I think it proves its
case convincingly. There is no doubt that courts which deal with family questions
should handle them in a keenly sympathetic and social-minded manner, free from
the formalities and technicalities of ordinary legal proceedings. Furthermore, such
courts should use such agencies as psychiatrists, social workers and the like in order
to achieve maximum results, as Judge Goldstein points out so aptly.
In this connection the author comments favorably upon the valuable work performed by the Fordham University School of Sociology.
Judge Goldstein's writings are based not alone upon his legal experience as a lawyer
and as a City Magistrate, but upon his long acquaintance with social problems,
He says, page 111: "When I was a boy our family consisted of ten. Eight children
and father and mother: three boys and five girls. We lived on Madison Street in
three rooms. To the three rooms I must not forget to add the fire-escape, which
served as a sleeping porch in the summer and an iceless icebox in the winter. Then,
too, the roof of the tenement was an open air dormitory during the summer nights
and clothes-drying emporium during the day."
After going through law school he became interested in social work and spent many
years in attempting to reinstate and salvage juvenile delinquents and wrongdoers.
Many of the instances furnished as illustrations come from his long personal acquaintance with social problems. This experience has led him to the conclusion that
it would be advisable to do away in the Family Court with all technical formalities
and to establish rather the atmosphere of a conference room with legal technicalities
t Regent, Fordham University, School of Law. Author, Tim Mnm (1925).
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left in the background. He feels also that in these courts the expense should be
lessened as far as possible. "The size of one's bankroll should not be the admission
ticket," he declares, "to a court of justice."
This is a distinctly worthwhile treatise and should be of much value to everyone
who is interested in social and family problems. In particular it should be helpful
to the lawyer and law student, so much of whose work is taken up with the troubles
of "The Family in Court."
I. MtAURICE WoNVasnn4

CASES ON MUNICIPrAL CORPORATIONS.

By Murray Seasongood.

Chicago: Callahan

and Company. 1934. pp. xviii, 713.
This case book, compiled by Professor Murray Seasongood of the College of Law
of the University of Cincinnati, is one of the National Case Book Series. The
typography, proof-reading and binding of the book make it one from which the
student should be loath to part.
The book was composed for a course of thirty hours. This, as the author states,
because the authorities of so many law schools are unwilling to allot a greater time
in their curricula to this hitherto neglected subject, of such really great importance.
Directly or indirectly, the book takes up very many of the topics with regard to
which the legal adviser of a city, town or village would be likely to find himself
concerned. It does, however, omit cases on the important subjects of conditions
precedent to the maintenance of actions at law for damages against municipalities
and the limitations of the times within which such actions must be commenced.
While it is true that the statutes, and decisions under them, on these subjects, are
almost as numerous as the municipalities they affect, no case book on the law of
municipal corporations should leave the student unconscious of their existence. Too
many litigants and private practitioners have seen their otherwise just demands
against municipalities defeated because notices of claim were not filed within the
times prescribed by statutes, sometimes buried in the welter of legislation, or
because their suits were not commenced within times, usually shorter than the
general periods of limitation, for the specific classes of actions.
Professor Seasongood may be forgiven for his, sometimes irritating, preference for
cases decided in the courts of Ohio. It is only natural that he should have been
tempted to impress the importance of his subject upon his classes by bringing before
them the decisions of the courts of the state in which they live and will practice.
For a student intending to practice in Ohio, or for a lawyer engaged in practice
in that state, the book is eminently practical. It is also highly valuable to students
or practitioners in other states.
To the practitioner who has actually participated in the forensic battles of a
municipality, the book adds to the conviction that the subdivision of the law
designated as "Municipal Corporations," is in such a state of flux that ancient
precedents are of little value, and familiarity with the latest decision of the highest
tribunal of the jurisdiction in which a controversy is litigated, is more to be desired
than devotion to any general theory, however sound. Professor Seasongood recognizes
this fact by using cases which are, in the main, not more than five years old.
f Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law. Author, Disnmra or mm
CoiORAI' FicIoN Azm ALzImn CooRATrON PromnEms (1927), FRA
sinn LncomRopRAm (1931), CASES ON THE LAW Or MORTOAGE (1925).
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An excellence of the book, perhaps covertly designed, is its gradual exposition of
the superiority of the condition of the people who live in communities governed by
freeholders' charters, such as exist under the constitution of California, over that
of the citizens in other states who have relied upon such disappointments as the
so-called Home Rule provisions of the constitution of the state of New York, to
bring them freedom from legislative domination in their purely local affairs.
Professor Seasongood argues no thesis in this regard, but, without express language,
encourages the thought that it would be wise for the states, especially those whose
large cities were important before the states themselves attained their prominence,
to be not so insistent on their sovereign dignity, and more willing to permit the
cities, out of which they grew, to conduct their interior affairs without interference or
compulsion by legislatures, never too friendly to cities, and sometimes too assertive
of their own mightiness.
All in all, Professor Seasongood's case book may be regarded as the effort of an
able and well-informed instructor to bring into the minds of students and practitioners, with the least effort on their part, the principles and peculiarities of the
law affecting municipal corporations. As such it merits high commendation.

J.

REPORT OP THE COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION
STATE.

Albany:

J. B. Lyon Company.

1934.

10SEPx LILL.'

OF JUSTICE IN

NEw YoPi,

pp. 1016.

The Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York State created by
the legislature in 1931, "to investigate and collect facts, relating to the present
administration of justice in the state" and "to present recommendations for its
improvements" has submitted its final report in a bound volume of slightly more than
a thousand pages. The record consists of a "Main Report," summarizing the result of
its labors, supplemented by a series of "Supporting Studies." It is these Supporting Studies, replete with tables of statistics, charts and graphs, that occupy most
of the printed page.
In reading this report one must bear in mind the fact that in 1919 a joint legislative committee was appointed to revise our system of civil procedure in this state.
As a result of its deliberations, what was then thought to be a system approximating
as nearly as possible the ideal, was adopted and became operative in 1921 under the
name of the "Civil Practice Act" and allied statutes. Like every other human
institution, this system far from being perfect, has displayed signs of weakness in
keeping abreast of the problems of civil litigation in the state. To use the words
of the Commission. "So far as civil litigation is concerned, criticisms of our judicial
system fall under three heads. First, the uncertainty, Second, the cost, and Third,
the delay." Of these three heads the Commission considers "delay" the major point
of criticism, and the elimination of this delay has been the "central object" of its
labors.
In an effort to solve the pioblem of delay the Commission has given its attention
to the functioning of the higher courts, the inferior courts and the rural justices
courts.
"It has found that the principal solution of the problem of delay does not lie in
changes in the trial procedure, but on the administrative side." The Commission finds
that only one case out of four, which is placed on the calendar of the court is ever
f Former Assistant Corporation Counsel, Head of the Appeals Division of New York City,
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tried. The calendars are cluttered with "never-to-be-tried-in-any-event cases."
Among the important recommendations which the Commission suggests to remedy
the situation in the Supreme Court, is the appointment of an "administrative judge"
in each district or county who shall supervise the administrative work of the court
and supervise the holding of the terms of the court and aignment of justices to
hold such terms. He shall also make recommendations to the Appellate Division
with respect to changes and alterations of the rules, as he believes will promote the
efficient transaction of business. The Commission finds that the "administrative
judge" system has worked efficiently in Cleveland, Detroit and Chicago. The Commission likewise recommends that there should be put into effect a state-wide system
for the assignment of Supreme Court justices, not depending on obtaining the
personal consent of the justices to serve outside the districts in which they are
elected, as is the case at present; that there should be a constitutional amendment
enabling county judges and surrogates to sit in the Supreme Court; that civil jurisdiction should be restored to the county courts in Greater New York; that legislation should be enacted permitting temporary referees to preside over jury trials on
consent; that similar legislation permit the use of temporary referees in the trial of
non-jury and equity cases; that the Cleveland Calendar System should be installed
in the counties of New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens, Nassau, Westchester, Albany,
Onondaga, Monroe and Erie Counties; that the vacation of the judges should be
limited and the court year lengthened. Recommendations designed to promote the
work of the inferior courts, notably the City Court and the Municipal Court of the
City of New York and the rural Justices of the Peace Courts, are likewise made
by the Commission.
That the pressing problem of delay cannot be solved merely by improving the
administrative work of the courts, but that the litigants themselves must be prevented
from using obstructive tactics which delay a prompt determination of the merits of
their respective claims, is also the conclusion of the Commission. To this end, the
Commission recommends that the use of discovery and examination of parties and
witnesses before trial be broadened and liberalized. This would be accomplished
by amending the present Civil Practice Sections, so as to make uniform the practice
in all four judicial departments in the state, and permit the unrestricted examination
of both witnesses as well as parties; extending the examination into matters of defense as well as offense, and requiring the production of books and records for use
on the examination, and their discovery and inspection by the service of the single
notice used to obtain the examination. This recommendation of the Commision
raises a controversial question, for many members of the Bar feel that such a "wide
open" remedy of examination and discovery might lead to great abuse, sufficient
in itself to offset any advantages derived. To quiet fears in this respect the Commission would limit the use of the examination of an ordinary witness at the trial
to cases where he is unavailable for personal appearance at the trial, and as an
additional safeguard it would be provided that the courts could direct that the examinations be taken secretly and be deposited sealed with the clerk of the court Those
who doubt the advisability of the full disclosure urged by the Commission are
sought to be reassured by the statement that in many jurisdictions in which it is
allowed, it is found to be seldom abused and has had a salutary effect in simplifying
the issues, in shortening trials, and promoting settlements out of court.
One of the most potent weapons heretofore, against dilatory tactics on the part of
an adversary has been the motion for summary judgment under Civil Practice Rules
113 and 114. The Commission has done "yeoman's service" in assisting the Appellate
Division in putting into effect the amendments of 1932 and 1933 to Rule 113, which
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have increased the efficacy of the remedy. The Commission in its report now
recommends that summary judgment be extended so as to be available in mandamus
proceedings under Civil Practice Act Section 1331 and to summary proceedings to
recover real property. A further extention is also urged, so as to enable the court
on the motion, to summarily dispose of purely formal issues raised by the pleadings
and to order the trial forthwith of the specified issue which remains.
Not all of the delay which impedes the administration of justice takes place in
connection with the trial of the case. The Commission finds that appellate practice,
as it now exists, lends itself to obstructive tactics. It recommends that the taking
of appeals from interlocutory orders be abolished and that such orders be reviewed
only "when and if" the final judgment is itself appealed. The Commission likewise
proposes a constitutional amendment permitting a direct appeal to the Court of
Appeals upon questions of law, from the court of first instance. The purpose of
this proposal, is to reduce the number of cases in which there is a double review of
the questions of law, first by the Appellate Division, and then by the Court of
Appeals.
From the comments made so far on the Commission's report, it would seem
that the underlying theme running through it all is the elimination of the delay,
which in some of the civil courts has caused the wheels of justice to grind so slowly
as to amount to a positive denial of justice. It would be erroneous to assume however that the Commission has limited itself to the consideration of this problem to
the exclusion of all others. The Commission has studied in a general way means
of improving the practice, procedure and the rules governing the admission of
evidence in the civil courts of the State. It recommends changes in the method of
serving domestic corporations with the summons and also in the method of substituted service and service by publication. Many other recommendations affecting
the pleadings, the noticing of the case for trial, the motion for the bill of particulars,
the waiver of a jury trial, the non-unanimous verdict, the taking of exceptions to the
decision of the court, and others of equal importance affecting different phases of
civil litigation have been made by the Commission.
If the methods of administering civil justice in the state are open to criticism,
the same may be said, the Commission finds, not only of our Code of Criminal
Procedure but of the substantive Criminal Law. The Commission finds that there
is need for a thorough revision of our Penal Law. It is not complete. Many of
the acts prohibited by law with penal sanction are not found in the Penal Law at
all. Nearly one-third of the New York statutory provisions on crimes are found
distributed throughout other statutes. Some provisiofhs of the Penal Law belong in
the Code of Criminal Procedure. There are many inconsistencies and ambiguities
in the definition of crimes, caused by careless amendment and there are many
repetitions and duplications resulting from the same cause. Many of the provisions
of the Penal Law are antiquated. These are some of-the defects which render revision imperative.
The Commission takes cognizance of the conviction of many, that perjury Is
widespread. It leads not only to congestion of the calendars but to a miscarriage of
justice. What is the answer? The Commission recommends that "material" be
stricken from the definition of perjury contained in Section 1620 of the Penal Law.
"The element of materiality is a stumbling block particularly as the appellate courts
have not made its meaning clear." The Commission further recommends the establishment of two degrees of perjury: "first degree perjury" to consist of false swearing
in a prosecution for felony and to be punishable itself as a felony; "second degree
perjury" to consist of any other false swearing where an oath is administered and
to be punishable as a misdemeanor. Amendments to Section 750 and 753 of the
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Judiciary Law are recommended so as to make false swearing punishable as a
criminal contempt.
The Commission calls attention to the fact that the Code of Criminal Procedure
has not been subjected to general revision by the legislature since 1881. During the
intervening fifty-three years it has been the victim of hasty and piecemeal amendment.
"The impressive fact stands out," states the Commission, "that it has in some respects lost touch with current requirements in criminal law enforcement." The Commission is awaiting the recommendations of its advisory committee as to changes in the
Criminal Code before presenting the matter to the legislature in a separate report.
After all has been said and done, the work of the Commission which has resulted
in the greatest single practical achievement, is its recommendation that a "Judicial
Council" and a 'aw Revision Commission" be created in the state of New York.
There is a sharp distinction between the two bodies. Judicial Councils have been
created in many states of the Union. The function of the Judicial Council is to
collect information, and to make recommendations to the legislature on matters
chiefly concerned with the administrative work of the courts and methods of
practice and procedure. The Law Revision Commission performs a work of a
different character. It is based on the idea of a "Ministry of Justice" advocated by
Mr. Justice Cardozo in articles written by him in 1921.' The function of the Law
Revision Commission or Ministry of Justice would be to continuously consider the
substantive statutory law of the state as distinguished from the administrative law
with a view to "scientific revision in the light of modem conditions." It is a
permanent agency to study "amendment and correction of the law." No state of
the Union has adopted the idea of such a Commission but in the countries of
continental Europe according to Justice Cardozo, the idea "has passed into the
realm of settled practice."
The Commission in its report recommends the establishment of a Judicial Council
and a Law Revision Commission in this state, and the legislature, adopting these
recommendations, has during the year 1934 enacted legislation creating a Judicial
Council and a Law Revision Commission for the state of New York. This is no
small tribute to the members of the Commission and their work.
The report of the Commission is a record of real achievement in the realm of
law reform. While it is a temporary body, its existence being limited by legislative
fiat, the work which it has initiated and performed so satisfactorily will be carried on
permanently by its offspring, the Judicial Council and the Law Revision Commission.
That its labors have been appreciated, is evidenced by the prompt recognition which
its recommendations have received from the legislature. In addition to establishing a
Judicial Council and a Law Revision Commission, legislation among other things, has
already been enacted, creating a "small claims division" of the Municipal Court of
the City of New York, the service of process on domestic corporations has been
facilitated by amendments and additions to the Stock Corporation Law; the procedure in noticing a civil case for trial has been simplified by eliminating the notice
of trial, the necessity of excepting to the court's rulings during the trial has been
eliminated, as has likewise been the requirement as to the filing of exceptions to the
decision after trial by the court or referee, without a jury. Many other reforms
recommended by the Commission will undoubtedly come in the course of time. As
a work of reference the Commission's report is of prime importance to the Bench
1. Cardozo, Ministry of Justice (1921) 35 HARv. L. Ray. 113.
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and Bar. The reading of it, particularly the "Supporting Studies," clarifies and
explains the nature of the judicial process as it exists in the state today.

EDWARD Q. CAuR.'
LORD READING AND HIS CASES: THE STUDY Op A GREAT CAREER. By
Walker-Smith. New York: The MacMillan Company. 1934. pp. xi, 400.

Derek

Four leaders of the English bar since the turn of the century were Sir Edward
Clarke, Sir Edward Carson, Rufus Isaacs, (now Lord Reading), and Edward
Marshall Hall. To the two excellent biographies of Marshall Hall and Carson which
have appeared in recent years has been added what we may call the "legal biography"
of a third member of that great quartette. The life of Lord Reading has been a
many-sided one but Walker-Smith has chosen the legal side for this book, in which
we catch only occasional glimpses of his subject's activities in the fields of politics
and statesmanship. Of Reading's work in Parliament we have some description; of
his work as the British representative in the United States and of his work as Viceroy
of India there is almost nothing. Limited as it is to the legal career of a great man,
the book is of especial interest to lawyers, but it will be read with hardly less interest
and appreciation by laymen as well.
The biography of Marshall Hall is more dramatic and sensational than this book
due to the fact that Hall was engaged almost exclusively in defending dramatic and
sensational criminal cases. Carson's legal career takes on an added interest because
of his position in the Irish controversy. Isaacs had but few criminal cases. He stood
a little apart from the bitter controversies of his time; perhaps, as his biographer
suggests, because as a member of a race which has been without a national home
for centuries, he could "not feel the burning passion on the question of Irish Home
Rule, which had consumed generations of Englishmen and Irishmen." Again, as
one of that people which "had preserved their religion for centuries amid fierce
persecution, [he] might be forgiven for thinking that in the eye of History, Welsh
Disestablishment would loom considerably less large than it did to excited partisans
in 1912."
One of his first important cases was Allen v. Flood,' which concerned a refinement
of the principle of the hallowed Lnmley v. Gye. 2 Many other important commercial
cases engaged his talents which are more than ordinarily interesting, especially his
labor cases and his exposure of the financial genius, Whittaker Wright. He was
counsel in several libel cases, two of the most interesting being the prosecution of
Sir Edward Russell for criminal libel, in which Isaacs was for the defense, and the
civil action of Cadbury v. The Evening Standard, in which he was for the plaintiff.
The frequency of libel cases in the English courts is rather surprising to an American
reader of biographies of English lawyers. If our greatest court sport is negligence
actions, theirs appears to be libel cases.
Seekers for sensation, however, will find that Issacs was concerned in a few
widely publicized cases, such as the Hartopp Divorce and the "Gaiety Girl Divorce
Case," the Gordon Custody Case and the defense of "Bob" Sievier for blackmail,
"The Honor of the King" and the famous Seddons' murder trial.
j Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
CAORmo's NEw YORK PRACrzCE (Revised ed. 1934).
1. [1898] A. C. I.
2. 2E. &B. 216 (Q.B. 1853).
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The most dramatic case of all those that concerned Lord Reading was one over
which he sat as Lord Chief Justice of England, to which exalted office he was appointed
just before the outbreak of the Great War. This was the trial of Sir Roger Casement
for high treason. The author devotes a long and interesting chapter to the background and to the trial of this case. He deals with the defendant with great fairness
and great sympathy. One who reads the account of this case and of other var-time
trials over which Lord Reading presided cannot but be impressed by the fact that
in the midst of the violence of popular prejudice and passion the English courts
serenely administered fair and impartial justice according to law.
Rufus Isaacs' style of advocacy was not bombastic. He appealed to the mind
rather than to the heart. He had the great art of selecting the salient features of
the case and sticking to them through thick and thin, then, at the end, ."driving them
home with great force of argument." His talents were admirably suited to argument
before the Bench of points of law no less than to convincing the mind of the jury.
He was not an orator and did not, therefore, make a great success in the House of
Commons. "The atmosphere [of the House]," says the author, "is widely different
from that of the Law Courts, and members expect, in the ordinary default of
original thought, either a certain warmth and passion to be introduced, or that a dry
theme be adorned with eloquence." How often, nevertheless, one wonders, does the
advocate in the law court endeavor to cover default of original thought by a certain
warmth and passion.
The author's style is lucid and lively. He interlards the recital of facts and
events with philosophic dissertation and sly asides of humor. The delicate task of
writing a biography of a still-living countryman who is at the flood of a great
career, he has accomplished with tact. He has not rendered fawning praise nor
has he refrained from criticism when it was due. A whole chapter, for example, is
devoted to the so-called "Marconi Scandals" and he does not hesitate to criticize
his subject's conduct in that connection.
It is to be hoped that more of these accounts of great English lawyers will be
forthcoming. Besides their general interest, we have something to learn from them.
As one reads these accounts, he gets the impression that our friends across the
Atlantic administer justice in a little better way than we do-that a trial there is,
indeed, a solemn inquiry into the truth of the matter rather than a contest of wits
between two attorneys for the delectation of the public, or of such audience as happens to be on hand.
GEORGE W. BACoNt

A TpEATISE ON RESMENCE AND Domc=r.
By Kossuth Kent Kennan Rochester:
The Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Company. 1934. pp. lxxiii, 931.
The object having been to make this work "as useful as possible to the working
lawyer," too much space is devoted to an attempted definition of the term "domicile."
Having, at the very outset, posited the truism that the concept is indefinable, the
author proceeds to prove the undebatable by presenting a symposium of "definitions
that do not define," gleaned from the Roman, continental, English and American
statutes, judicial opinions, treatises and even dictionaries. Dissatisfaction with all
of these is expressed, including the most recent "definition" proposed by the
American Law Institute in its first Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws. The
-t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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author then proposes a definition of his own: "Domicile is a word used to express
the legal relation existing between a person and a particular place or territory. Such
relation arises by residence in the place or territory accompanied by an intention to
remain for an unlimited time, or it is created by operation of law as in case of birth,
minority or marriage." (p. 60) Many there are who will find this definition at least
as unsatisfactory as its inadequate predecessors. It is conceded to be "not ideal."
The truth is that the "working lawyer" is not interested in christening legal
concepts. He is concerned not so much with how "domicile" may be best defined, as
with proving the fact of domicile when it becomes necessary to do so. It is when
the author presents the wealth of judicially recognized criteria of domicile that he
performs a real service to the busy practitioner. These criteria are treated in five
golden chapters, which present with scholarly thoroughness a digest of decisions from
wideflung jurisdictions. The sum of these criteria gives to the litigating lawyer a
complete plan of attack or defense in any case of disputed domicile.
Of equal practical value are the chapters considering residence and domicile in
instances of attachment, divorce jurisdiction, limitations and voting and suffrage
rights. Appended to each of these chapters is a useful compendium of the relative
statutory provisions as to residence and domicile obtaining in all the American states.
The chapter on divorce contains an interesting note regarding the questionable
validity of Mexican and Reno decrees.
The subject of "Domicile and Taxation" is especially well treated. Here again, not
only are the domiciliary requirements in various states compared and contrasted,
but French, English and Canadian laws controlling the subject are compiled and
discussed.
The chief service performed by the author is that he has brought to one accessible
spot far-off sources of valuable information on an important subject, otherwise not
ready at hand to the average lawyer.
WLmAm R. MEAOHGER.

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE WITH CAsEs FOR DIscussioN.
Wilbur Humble. Chicago: Callaghan & Company. 1934. pp. vi, 424.

By Henry

The teacher reviewing a textbook very naturally considers it from the viewpoint
of its value to the law student. We cannot avoid the conclusion that this book, though
it possesses certain highly meritorious features to which we shall gladly pay tribute,
is unfortunate in its topical arrangement. This, it seems to us, is due to a faulty
analysis of the subject matter of the law of evidence generally. Our study and
our experience in the classroom have convinced us that Professor Thayer's analysis,
which is disclosed by the arrangement of topics in his Cases on Evidence, is the
correct one. This arrangement was followed by the compilers of the case-book now
and for a number of years in use at the Fordham University School of Law. This
particular analytical arrangement is based upon the perception that its excluding
function is the chief characteristic of our law of evidence. This being true, it
seems to us that it is highly desirable, first, to apprise the student of that fact at the
earliest possible moment, and, second, to place all matters which a correct analysis
will disclose as falling within one or the other of the rules of exclusion under that
general category. Mr. Humble's first error, it seems to us, is to postpone the "Leading
Rules of Evidence" until he has considered the matter of "Witnesses.". After pret Fordham University, School of Law.

1935]

BOOK REVIEWS

senting the necessary 'Preliminary Topics," then it would, as under Professor
Thayer's arrangement, facilitate the labor of the student to have presented to him
the rules of exclusion so that as soon as practicable he may be brought to an understanding that the main purpose of his study is to acquire a knowledge of these
rules. In the second place, we think that the title "Leading Rules of Exclusion"
would be more illuminating to the student than that of "Leading Rules of Evidence,"
for the very simple reason that the leading rules of evidence are rules of exclusion.
Furthermore, an immediate projection of the five great rules of exclusion in a brief
statement under the title head would be of material assistance. Mr. Humble would
also, we think, have done better if he had labeled all matters from "Dying Declarations" to "Former Testimony," inclusive, as "Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule;"
"Public Documents" and "Ancient Documents" should be similarly classified. The
remaining matters only, which Mr. Humble places under "Rules Relating to Writings," properly belong there. On the other hand, though there is ample authority
for so doing, we think that the classifications of "Admissions" under "Hearsay" is
less desirable than treating them as belonging under "Preliminary Topics," on the
theory that they are not "Evidence" but are "Substitutes for Evidence." "Character,"
though it is quite true that evidence relating thereto may be regarded as "Circumstantial Evidence," would stand out in higher relief if it were treated as a separate
rule of exclusion. So also is the case with those collateral matters which Mr.
Humble classifies under "Circumstantial Evidence." They, too, should be classified
as falling under a separate and distinct rule of exclusion. All of the foregoing has
reference to Mr. Humble's analytical arrangement. Except for what we cannot
but consider serious defects in that respect, we regard the book as an excellent
piece of work. The English is particularly clear and simple. This of course adds
much to the pleasure experienced in reading it. The book though short, which it
was obviously intended to be, is nevertheless comprehensive in its scope. Its only
omission, it seems to us, appears in its comparative paucity of New York citations.
This, of course, is not intended to suggest a serious defect, but we do think that a
court of the high repute of the New York Court of Appeals is deserving of a more
abundant reference to its decisions.
Liovn M. HowEL.f

COURTS AND JuDGEs IN- FANcE, GEnXANY AND 'ENGLAND.

London and New York:

Oxford University Press.

By R. C. K. Ensor.

1933. pp. vi, 144.

This short book fills a gap in Anglo-American legal literature. The continental
lawyer (such as the author of these lines) often has occasion to notice how selfsufficient and how untouched by legal ideas and institutions of the non-English speaking world the Anglo-American law is developing; how unfamiliar and strange
European procedure, courts and judges are to Americans and Englishmen.
Mr. Ensor's book is a praiseworthy attempt to utilize the methods of comparative
jurisprudence in imparting knowledge concerning the constitution and the working
of the German and French courts. That the book is brief, will make it so much more
useful to the English speaking observer for whom detailed knowledge is of doubtful
value. And to the American reader, more than to the English lawyer who need not
learn the fundamentals of English judicature any longer, it must be of essential
benefit that Air. Ensor draws his picture of French and German courts and judges

1f Associate
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on the background of a description of the English court system. For, in spite of the
common origin of American and English law, they are growing more and more different in the course of time.
Mr. Ensor commences his story by a description of the English judicature, stressing as its distinguishing features the absence of a judicial profession and of promotion to higher posts among the English judges; a judge in England generally keeps
his rank and place from the day of appointment to the day of his death or resigna.
tion. Furthermore, the English judges sit singly in the courts of first instance. They
receive very large salaries, while in France and Germany the principle of "collegiality"
prevails and the judiciary is poorly paid. In England juries decide the facts even
in the civil courts. The lower criminal courts outside the metropolitan area of
London are presided over and staffed exclusively by laymen without previous legal
training. There is no ministry of justice in England. In France and Germany, on
the contrary, the administration of justice is organized by a ministry; in criminal and
civil courts alike learned professional judges play the leading roles. No juries collaborate in civil cases, the judge deciding at once on the facts and on the law; and
even in criminal jurisdiction, juries play a negligible part.
In France and Germany we find a professional judiciary. A boy finishing his
legal education and passing his law examinations will have to decide, right at the
outset of his career, whether he wishes to become a judge or a lawyer. If he enters
the judicial career, he must be prepared to live in narrow economic circumstances and
to accept a good social standing as a substitute for earthly means. The sole chance
he has to improve his financial situation, outside of gaining wealth through marriage (venality of judges is practically unknown and unheard of in France and
Germany) is the promotion from step to step on the long ladder of judicial hierarchy.
The thorough professional and academic training of French and German judges, the
comparatively low costs of litigation in both countries, the lack of technicalities in
procedure that promotes speed in decisions, and the greater simplicity, clearness,
handiness of French and German code law make litigation much more popular on
the continent than in England. French and German courts are deciding an infinitely
larger amount of cases day by day than English courts, in spite of the high quality
of their judges. On the other hand, while England is getting along with approximately two hundred paid judges, the about equally populated states of France and
Prussia boast of more than three thousand judges each.
Mr. Ensor's representation of French and German conditions is remarkably fair
and well informed. As the approach to foreign institutions is extremely difficult, the
writer of these lines does not intend to express any deprecation of the book by
pointing out a few minor errors in Mr. Ensor's story. The author errs when he
ascribes to the German office courts jurisdiction of matters up to eight hundred
Reichsmarks instead of one thousand (p. 59); when he denies the jurisdiction of
these courts in actions on bills of exchange and checks (p. 60, n.); when he denies
the existence of a German tribunal of conflicts to demarcate between the jurisdiction
of civil and administrative courts and attributes to the Obervervaltungsgericht 1 the
power of demarcation as it pleases. (p. 79) The Bayerische Oberste Landesgerlicht
is not, as the author says, a court comparable to the Supreme Regional Courts.
(p. 61) The minimum jurisdictional amount for appeals to the Reichsgericht has
been six thousand Reichsmarks since 1929, and not four thousand, as the author
states. There are no juries in Germany at all. The "Jury Courts" that try the most
serious felonies as murder, arson, perjury, etc., mentioned by the author on page
61, are such only in name, the "jurors" sitting with the professional judges to decide
1. Highest Prussian court for the adjudication of questions of administrative law.
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the facts and the law together and deliberating on the case under the leadership of
the presiding judge.
There is one remark in the book that is very startling, but on account of the
brevity of the book it is not explained fully enough to leave a full understanding of
its factual background with the English or American reader. This is Mr. Ensor's
contention that the German judicial system, for the high quality of the German
codes, of the German universities, and of their products, the German judges, bas a
serious claim to be regarded as the best in Europe. I think this contention is true
in so far as civil jurisdiction is concerned, but how then, the reader may ask, is this
possible if the German judicial machinery employs so many thousands of judges in a
territory that in England-and I may add in the United States-is judicially supervised by only a small fraction of this number? Allow me to offer a bit of constructive criticism by answering this question.
The German system rests upon the fundamental idea that justice must be available
for poor or rich alike; that by furnishing proper institutions for the vigilant surveillance of all transactions between citizens, the state must do its utmost to prevent
unclear legal situations making for quarrel and litigation; that where disputes arise,
if large or small, the judicial officers of the state must be near at hand; that justice
must be meted out with almost lightning speed, if the commonweal is to thrive.
Vigilance over important transactions is exercised by the introduction of the land
registry in transactions concerning real estate and rights as to land. No vendee, no
mortgagee need worry about his vendor's or mortgagor's title. The land records are
open to him. And only by entry in a land record are property or rights to land
transferred or created. The land records enjoy public faith. A vendee or mortgagee,
once entered in the book as such in reliance on previous book entries, can never be
done out of his rights by third parties claiming prior or better rights not on record.
Other records are kept concerning property relations between husband and wife, ships
and rights relative thereto, concerning commercial firms, associations, and corporations. The public may to a large extent rely on the correctness of such records.
Every contract leading to an entry in a public record must be made before a
judge or a notary (a high official of judicial standing and training) who is bound to
enlighten the parties as to the legality and the implications of their declarations.
Thousands of judges, notaries, and lawyers are necessary to transact this work, which
spells a high degree of certainty and assurance in all legal dealings.
If a law suit is necessary, the poor man has to pay no court fees, and a lawyer of
his choice is assigned to him and paid for by the state. And the wronged party
winning in an action at law can recover his full costs from the opponent, including all
lawyer's fees and other expenses.
The utmost is done to speed up the procedure. I think no other courts can compete in rapidity of procedure with the German labor courts, where four days after
filing of the complaint the first hearing is held, and, including trial and arguments, an
ordinary case generally is decided within the fraction of a month.
The courts' business for all these reasons is overwhelming; and only due to the
clarity of the German laws and to the high training of judges and lawyers (seven
years of study after junior college and two severe examinations, oral and in writing,
are necessary to qualify), is it possible to handle this amount of work. The large
staff of judges, therefore, finds its reason for existing in the extensive juridical protection the country provides for its citizens.
So tremendous a machinery must have its shortcomings too, and the reformer
still has a large field in the German system as well as in any other system in the
world. But what has been said may suffice to show what stimulation for testing the
soundness of our own institutions, what an enlargement of views every jurist can
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derive from making himself acquainted with the ways and means of legislation and
administration of justice in other civilized countries. For such endeavors Mr.
Ensor, by his book, will provide an excellent beginning because of his sound judg.
ment, his genuine knowledge of the topic, and his charming style.
GUNTHER JACOBSON,
t
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